The ink is barely dry on the most significant privatization deal in Kenya’s history, and the questions are already louder than the answers. On Thursday, Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi confirmed what many had whispered but few wanted to believe: the government has sold a 15% stake in Safaricom to South Africa’s Vodacom Group.

The deal, valued at a staggering KES 244.5 billion ($1.9 billion), effectively hands majority control of Kenya’s most profitable company to a foreign entity. Vodacom’s stake rises from 35% to a commanding 55%, leaving the Kenyan government with a minority 20% holding.

For the average Kenyan, the immediate question is not about corporate governance, but survival: Will this lower the cost of unga? Will M-Pesa fees go up? Is our data safe?

Mbadi’s narrative is simple: We needed cash, and we needed it now. But as with all things involving billions of shillings, the devil is in the details.

The Math: A Premium or a Discount?

To understand the fury in Parliament, you have to look at the price tag. The Treasury sold the shares at KES 34 each. On paper, this looks like a win—it represents a premium of over 20% compared to the recent market average of KES 28 at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).

“We are getting a premium because we are selling to a strategic partner who understands the value,” Mbadi argued on Citizen TV, dismissing claims of a fire sale. He emphasized that dumping 6 billion shares on the open market would have crashed the stock price, yielding far less for the taxpayer.

However, analysts are not popping champagne. Standard Investment Bank (SIB) has flagged the deal, noting that their fair value estimate for Safaricom is actually KES 40.19 per share. By selling at KES 34, the government may have left approximately KES 37 billion on the table.

• Deal Price: KES 34.00 per share
• Market Price (Pre-deal): ~KES 28.00
• Fair Value Estimate (SIB): KES 40.19
• Total Cash Injection: KES 244.5 billion (includes upfront payment for future dividends)

Why Vodacom and Not You?

A burning question from the public has been: Why wasn’t this sold to Kenyans? If Safaricom is our national jewel, why not let Wanjiku buy more shares through the NSE?

Mbadi’s response points to the harsh reality of our current economy. The local market simply does not have the liquidity to absorb a KES 200 billion sale without collapsing. Furthermore, the government prioritized hard currency. By selling to a South African giant, the Treasury receives payment in dollars and rands, bolstering our foreign exchange reserves and helping to stabilize the shilling against the dollar.

“Hard currencies have the benefit of improving our forex reserves,” Mbadi noted. In simple terms: this deal is a desperate bid to keep the shilling from sliding further, which directly impacts the cost of fuel and electricity.

The Sovereignty Trade-Off

Perhaps the most controversial aspect is the loss of control. With 55% ownership, Vodacom can now consolidate Safaricom’s financials into its own. Critics, including Kiharu MP Ndindi Nyoro, have warned that we are ceding control of a strategic national asset.

To counter this, the government negotiated strict conditions to preserve Safaricom’s “Kenyan soul”:

• Leadership: The CEO and Chairman must always be Kenyan citizens.
• Identity: No changes to the Safaricom brand, name, or logo without government consent.
• Jobs: No layoffs permitted for at least three years.
• Foundations: Trustees of the Safaricom and M-Pesa Foundations must remain Kenyan.

These safeguards are designed to calm fears that decisions about M-Pesa—the lifeline of Kenya’s economy—will be made in Johannesburg. However, minority shareholders often find their influence limited, regardless of what is written on paper.

Mortgaging the Future?

There is a final, quieter detail that deserves scrutiny. The deal includes an upfront payment of KES 40.2 billion in exchange for the rights to future dividends on the government’s remaining 20% stake. Essentially, the Treasury has eaten its lunch and dinner at the same time.

While this plugs the budget deficit for the 2025/2026 financial year without raising taxes, it removes a reliable stream of annual income that future governments—and generations—would have relied on. We have traded a steady flow of golden eggs for a one-time feast.

As the dust settles, the true test will be how this KES 244.5 billion is spent. If it vanishes into recurrent expenditure or opaque projects, history will judge this not as a strategic sale, but as the moment Kenya sold its crown jewel to pay the rent.