Is Kenya's failure to launch a failure of leadership, or a failure of the citizenry? In a provocative diagnosis of the national condition, economic expert Eunice Wangithi has argued that Kenya's chaotic state is a direct reflection of its people's indiscipline, not just government policy.

Appearing on Inooro TV's Kimuri show, Wangithi dismantled the popular narrative that the presidency holds the magic wand for development. Instead, she held up a mirror to the wananchi, contrasting Kenya's "anything goes" attitude with the rigorous civic discipline of Singapore—a nation that rose from a third-world backwater to a first-world metropolis in a single generation by enforcing strict social order.

The Singapore Mirage

"We want Singapore results with Kenyan habits, and it doesn't work that way," Wangithi argued. She cited the Asian tiger's success not merely as a triumph of economic policy, but as a victory of functioning systems and a culture of responsibility. In Singapore, littering invites a fine; in Nairobi, overlapping matatus and gridlocked pavements are accepted as "hustle."

Wangithi's critique cuts to the core of the Kenyan psyche. While politicians are routinely pilloried for corruption, she points out that the average citizen 's tolerance for disorder—seen most visibly in the chaotic transport sector—enables the very dysfunction they complain about.

• The Civic Deficit: "Development begins with the mindset," she stated. "If we cannot respect a simple traffic light, how can we respect a national budget?"
• The Irony of History: Wangithi noted that Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, once borrowed concepts from Kenya, including the National Youth Service model. Yet, while Singapore refined these systems, Kenya allowed them to rot through apathy and graft.
• Vision vs. Reality: Leadership requires more than a manifesto; it requires a populace willing to be led. Wangithi stressed that vision without a disciplined citizenry is just a hallucination.

A Hard Pill to Swallow

This perspective challenges the comfortable opposition politics of 2026, which largely focuses on the failures of the Kenya Kwanza administration. By shifting the burden of "fixing the country" back to the individual—the driver, the trader, the voter—Wangithi suggests that the "First World" dream sold by politicians is unattainable until Kenyans fundamentally change how they interact with their own laws.

As the 2027 election cycle begins to heat up, the question remains: Are Kenyans ready to vote for the order they claim to crave, or is the chaos simply too profitable to give up?